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THE DEVELOPMENT OF ZONING
A. Introduction
The term "Zoning" is used in this article only in its broad sense to
mean a comprehensive scheme for the districting of a city by law to
accomplish certain ends. Zoning for cities has been defined as: "The
creation by law of districts, in which regulations, differing in different
districts, prohibit injurious and unsuitable structures and uses of
structures and land."2 The zone plan helps to coordinate the various
parts of the city plan in accordance with a predetermined city-wide
scheme for development.3 It is in the essence the exercise of the com-
munity right to regulate to a limited degree the private uses of buildings
and land in the interests of the public health, safety and general welfare.
This article will include a brief resum6 of the nature and history of
zoning and an analysis of its legal basis with special reference to Missouri.
B. General Nature of Zoning
Zoning laws have become necessary in this country to help cure the
evils and to correct the tendencies that the unregulated and unre-
stricted phenomenal growth of our cities has produced.' We have at-
tained little or no degree of control over the haphazard growth of our
American city and we are reaping the inevitable reward-chaotic
conditions in many of our larger cities. Over-crowding of the land with
its consequent increase in immorality, crime and disease is one of the
direct results5 of the unregulated growth of our cities. The noise, smoke,
confusion, din, and dirt to which parts of the residential areas of our
cities are subjected are hardly conducive to congenial environment and
good citizenship. The so-called right of intrusion has worked to make
1. LL.B. University of Missouri, 1924. This article is the thesis written by Mr.
Wells in partial fulfillment for the degree of A.M. in the Graduate School of the
University of Missouri, 1925.
2. Bassett, Nat. Mun. Rev., Suppl., IX, p. 315.
3. Adams, Am. City, XXV, p. 213.
4. For further information see, Swan, Am. City, XXII, p. 339-344.
5. Discussed in The Zone Plan, by City Plan Commission of St. Louis, pp.
58-68.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
land values unstable.6 Cities have been confronted with shifting neigh-
borhoods with the attendant economic loss. The city's administrative
problem concerning street construction, lighting, and traffic,7 proper
water supply, sanitation, fire and police protection, and housing$ be-
comes more complex when the city is providing for districts that are
both residential and industrial.
It is evident that zoning by helping to solve these problems has not
only a great economic value but is of great social and political significance
as well. The American public is awakening to that fact and city planning
and zoning are making rapid strides in this country. 9
Zoning power rests with the state.10 It must either be justified under
the police power or under the power of eminent domain. It is usually
exercised under a city ordinance after the state legislature has given
the power under an enabling act which may be general, or special, if the
state constitution does not prohibit special legislation. It is becoming
more and more the practice to pass zoning-enabling acts and this fact is
raising a strong presumption in law that local communities do not have
power to zone without express authorization." Power to zone may be
given to the municipalities in any way that the state, acting within its
constitutional scope, may see fit to give it. Massachusetts" and Louisiana
have by constitutional amendments authorized their legislatures to pass
zoning legislation. It is well settled that states have the power to enact
zoning laws if there is no constitutional prohibition.
The purpose of zoning is to divide the city into various districts for
the uses for which they are best suited and to protect and accentuate
the individuality of the districts thus created. Generally, zoning laws do
not apply retroactively. They only conserve the future by controlling
the city's growth in accordance with a predetermined city-wide schcme
for development.
Zoning deals with fundamentals. In connection with proper city
planning it provides the city dweller with better physical, social, and
moral environment and the results are healthy, contented people and
better citizenship. From the economic point of view, it pays by giving
stability to land values, and by preventing much unnecessary expense
through simplification of the city's administration problems. Conven-
6. See Swan, Am. City, XIX, p. 7-10.
7. Fisher, Am. City, XXX, p. 144.
8. Adams, Am. City, XXIV, p. 28 7.
9. See infra.
10. Chamberlain and Pierson, Am. Bar Ass'n Jour., X, pp. 185-187.
11. People ex rel. Friend v. City of Chicago, (1913) 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609;
Matter of Backer v. Switzer, (1924) 209 App. Div. (N. Y.) 151,205 N. Y. S. 108.
12. Constitution, Amendments, Art. 71 (1919).
13. Veiller, Am. City, X, pp. 525-529.
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ience to the city dweller and a more beautiful city are only incidents and
by-products.
A comprehensive zonirrg law divides the city into three kinds of
districts-for use, for height, and for area or size of building. The
districts need not be coterminous but it is evident that the use would have
a pronounced effect on the needs as to height and area. Higher buildings
would be more necessary in a commercial district than in a residential
district. A larger per cent of the area of the lot should be available
for buildings in an industrial district than in a residential district.
The "use" districts may be designated as follows: (1) First Resi-
dential (restricted to one-family homes); (2) Residential (all sorts of
resident dwellings); (3) Commercial; (4) Light Industrial; (5) Heavy
Industrial; (6) Unrestricted; (7) Undetermined. The names of the dis-
tricts are for the greater part self-explanatory but a zoning law would of
necessity be very detailed regarding each district. Height districts may
be classified as follows: (1) 50 foot height district; (2) 75 foot height
district; (3) 130 foot height district; (4) 160 foot height district; (5)
200 foot height district. Height restrictions are imposed primarily
to insure adequate light and air, and to prevent congestion, and are of
importance as protective measures against fire.
Area districts may be described as follows: (1) 30 per cent area dis-
trict; (2) 40 per cent area district; (3) 60 per cent area district; (4) 80
per cent area district.
Many zoning laws provide a procedure for relief against the strict
enforcement of the height, area, and use restrictions in particular cases
if strict enforcement would be unduly arbitrary and if giving the relief
would not infringe on the purposes of the zoning law.14
C. Origin of Zoning in Europe
The zoning idea originated in Europe where city planning move-
ments and methods are far in advance of similar progress in the United
States. Baumeister, a noted German city planner, put forth the zoning
idea and it was first applied in Frankfort in 1884.15 The plan was greatly
extended in Germany by the Lex Adickes adopted in 1891.15 Zoning was
soon adopted by most of the continental countries and England incor-
porated the principle of zoning in her Town Planning Act of 1909.
Zoning in European countries has not been restricted by written con-
stitutions as in the United States. It has now been widely adopted in
Germany, England, Italy, and many of the other European countries.
14. Bassett, Am. City, XXV. p. 50.
15. Munro, Mun. Govt. and Admin., II, p. 93.
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D. Introduction and Development in the United States
The first zoning in the United States was in Boston in 1904.10
Boston was divided into two districts kno'n as A District and B Dis-
trict. The limitations were only as to the height of buildings above the
street level. The validity of this act as a proper exercise of police power
was sustained by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1907,17 and con-
firmed by the United States Supreme Court in 1908.18 In 1909 Los
Angeles adopted a zoning ordinance on the basis of "use". It virtually
divided the city into two districts-residential and non-residential
districts. The ordinance has been upheld by the California Supreme
Court and the Supreme Court of the United States.' 9 New York City in
1916 adopted the most comprehensive zoning scheme to be found in
this country or abroad. Thus far it has worked well.2"
That the zoning idea has made a strong appeal to the American
public is shown by its rapid spread in this country. On Jan. 1, 1923
there were 129 zoned cities in the United States.2 On Jan. 1, 1925
there were approximately 24,000,000 people living in 320 municipalities
enjoying the benefits of zoning.
In 1923 the advisory committee on zoning of the Department of
Commerce, Washington, D. C., prepared a standard state zoning-
enabling act as a model for those desiring to introduce zoning laws in
their states. Great care was used in the preparation of this draft
act and since Jan. 1, 1923 the twenty-two states that have enacted
zoning legislation have used all or a major portion of it. Thirty-nine
states and the District of Columbia now have zoning laws in some form.
The spread of zoning in the United States is best shown by the
following table. 2
No. of cities that have Adopted over period
Name of State adopted zoning of years
Alabama .............................. 1 1924
Arkansas .............................. 1 1924
California ....................... 38 1920-192423
Colorado .............................. 1 1923
Connecticut ........................ 1 1924
Delaware ......................-....... 1 1924
16. See Bassett, Nat. Mun. Rev., Suppl., IX, p. 321.
17. Welch v. Swasey, (1907) 193 Mass. 364, 79 N. E. 745.
18. Welch v. Swasey, (1908) 214 U. S. 91.
19. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, (1913) 165 Cal. 416, (1915) 239 U. S. 394.
20. Bassett, Am. City, XXV, p. 625.
21. Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D. C., Zoning Progress in the U. S. (1925).
22. Compiled from data in Dept. of Commerce, Washington, D. C., Zoning
Progress in the U. S. (1925).
23. Except Los Angeles, zoned in 1909.
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No. of states that have Adopted over period
Name of State adopted zoning of years
Florida ...........................-2 1923-1924
Georgia --------.....------------- - 1 1922
Illinois -.-........------------------- - 36 1921-1924
Indiana ... ........................-5 1922- 1923
Iowa -------.....-------------------- 1 1924
Kansas ------------------------------- 4 1921-1924
M aryland ..................... 1 1923
Massachusetts ................ 24 1920-1924;1
M ichigan .........................-9 192'-1924
Minnesota -......-- - ........... 2 192-1924
M issouri ........................-4 1922-1923
Nebraska --------------------------- 1 1923
Nevada -----...----- .......- - ------- 1 1924
New Jersey ....................-72 1919-1924
New York2 . .............. 56 1916-1924
North Carolina - --------------- 1 1923
North Dakota -- ----------.... 1 1924
Ohio ---------...-------- .....------- -- 21 1920-1924
Oklahoma -.........--------- - 2 1923
Oregon ------.....-------------- - 1 1924
Pennsylvania ---------------------- 4 1923-1924
Rhode Island ................... 4 1922-1923
South Carolina .................-1 1924
Tennessee -------------------------- - 1 1922
Utah -------............-------------- 1 1920
Virginia.--......................... 4 1929-1924
W ashington ------------------------ 2 1919-1923
Wisconsin ---------------- 14 1915-1924
District of Columbia... 1 1920
E. Zoning Progress in Missouri
There have not been many attempts at zoning in Missouri. The
Missouri Supreme Court in 1893 in the case of St. Louis v. Hill 2- held
unconstitutional a law that provided that houses on Forest Park Boule-
vard should conform to certain building lines-that there should be a
40 foot distance from the building line to the street. The same court in
189827 held a St. Louis ordinance unconstitutional that provided that
property on a certain street should be used for residential purposes only.
The theory of these two cases seems to have been that the restrictions
24. Boston adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance in 1924 to replace one
of 1904.
25. Only New York City was zoned 1916-1919.
26. 116 Mo. 527,22S. W. 861.
27. City of St. Louis v. Dorr, (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. NV. 1094, 46 S. W. 976.
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would have been sustained if adequate compensation had been made to
the injured parties.
In 1911 the State Supreme Court28 held a St. Louis ordinance that
purported to regulate the size, height, and position of billboards along
the street to be a proper exercise of the police power. The case was taken
to the United States Supreme Court 9 and was there dismissed by agree-
ment. The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the billboard ordinance again
in St. Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis.3" The decision in that case
was affirmed by the Federal Supreme Court.31
The Kansas City ordinance number 39946 that restricted the use of
property on a certain street to residential purposes was held to be a
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain and not a violation of
due process as guaranteed by the state and federal constitutions. "
These cases are of importance because they show the attitude of the
" Missouri courts on the matter of public restriction on the use of private
real property in the city.
St. Louis was the first Missouri city to adopt real zoning and in
1918 passed a comprehensive zoning ordinance. The city was divided
into five "use" districts, four height districts, and four area districts.
The ordinance was declared unconstitutional by the Missouri Supreme
Court in 1923.11 The Missouri Legislature in 1921 passed two zoning-
enabling acts.m University City and Richmond Heights passed zoning
ordinances in 1922 under the law of 1921. Webster Groves passed a
zoning ordinance in 1923. Kansas City acting under the authority
conferred by the above-mentioned statutes adopted a comprehensive
zoning ordinance June 4, 1923. The question of the lfgality of this ordi-
nance has never been before the State Supreme Court. The new Kansas
City charter adopted February 24, 1925, provided,35 that the city should
be zoned, with restrictions on height, use, and building "to promote the
public health, safety, convenience, comfort, morals, prosperity, or
general welfare."
28. St. Louis Gunning ldverlising Co. v. City of St. Louis (1911) 235 Mo. 99,
137 S. W. 929.
29. (1913) 231 U. S. 761.
30. (1917) 195 S. W. 717.
31. (1919) 249 U. S. 269.
32. Kansas City v. Liebi et al., (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404.
33. State ex reL Penrose Inv. Co. v. Mc Kelvey, (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474;
City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, (1923) 301 Mo. 231,256 S. W. 489.
34. Laws of 1921, S. B. 61, Secs. 1-8. Applies to "Cities or towns having a
population of 50,000 or less." Laws of 1921 S. B. 332, Secs. 1-9. Applies to "Cities
having a population of not less than 200,000 nor more than 600,000."
35. Kansas City Charter of 1925. See Art. 1, Sec. 1, Par. 55. Read, in connec-
tion with this, secs. 400,401,402 and 403 of Art. XIII. Also Sec. 128, Art. VI.
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It seems evident from reading the various provisions of the charter
that Kansas City considers zoning as a proper exercise of the police
power and will ndt attempt zoning under eminent domain.
The future success of zoning in Missouri can be predicted only after
a careful study of the opinions of the State Supreme Court in the above
and other cases.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON ZONING
A. In General
Although the idea of zoning originated in Europe, zoning, as exem2
plified in the United States, is "distinctively an American movement."
This is so because there are certain federal and state constitutional provi-
sions, peculiar to our American political machinery, that have had a
profound influence on the methods and principles employed in zoning.
Zoning in' the United States, outside the District of Columbia, is not a
matter that falls within the enumerated powers delegated to our Federal
Government. The power to enact zoning laws then rests wholly with
each state.
Most of the states that have authorized zoning justify it under the
state's police power. A few instances in which zoning has been carried
out under the power of eminent domain constitute the exception. But
the state while exercising these two so-called inherent powers to further
the practice of zoning must keep within certain constitutional bounds.
These powers are limited by state and federal constitutional provisions.
An outstanding feature of zoning is the regulation and restriction put
upon the use of private property in a zoned area. As we conceive of
property as being not only a tangible thing, but intangible in its nature,
not merely the thing itself but the relation to the thing, the rights in
relation to it, it is clear that any restriction upon that relation as imposed
by a zoning ordinance impairs a property right.
The fifth amendment to the federal constitution provides that "no
person shall ..... be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation." This is a restriction on the power of the United
States and does not apply to state action. But by the fourteenth amend-
ment 6 of the United States Constitution, state action is limited by
these words: "nor shall anyState deprive any person of life, libertyor
property without due process of law;37 nor deny to any person within its
36. Amendment 14, Par. 1.
37. This provision will be referred to throughout this chapter as the "Due
Process" clause.
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jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 8 Similar provisions in
many state constitutions offer additional guarantees of protection against
state action. It is these constitutional provisions that protect property
rights from the improper use of either the police power or the power of
eminent domain.
The decisions in the various state courts in which the constitutional-
ity of zoning has been questioned indicate that the states have very
much the same constitutional restrictions on the general exercise of the
police power and the power of eminent domain. In practically every
case the provisions contain no further restrictions than are found in the
'federal constitution. The eminent domain provision in some state con-
stitutions contains a damage clause but this does not operate as a re-
striction on the police power as interpreted by most courts.39 Massa-
chusetts and Louisiana have authorized the passage of zoning laws by
constitutional provision.
B. Zoning Under the Police Power
The police power is often referred to as the inherent power in the
state government to make regulations to protect or promote health,
safety, education, morals, order, and the general welfare. Justice Holmes
of the United States Supreme Court in Noble State Bank v. Haskell'
said: "It may be said in a general way that the police power extends
to all the great public needs."
State regulations under the police power are not necessarily negative
in character in that they prohibit action. On the contrary, police regula-
tions often have a positive affirmative aspect. Especially is this true
when a state authorizes zoning ordinances to promote health, safety,
morals, order and general welfare. Since as a rule no compensation is
allowed for loss or injury resulting from police regulations, the courts
have refused io sustain a measure purporting to be an exercise of the
police power, unless the measure tends in a sufficient degree to accom-
plish a purpose justifiable under the police power and also is free from
unreasonableness. 41 Reasonable classification for the application of a
38. This provision will be referred to throughout this chapter as the "Equality
Clause."
39. This matter will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.
40. (1911)219U.S. 104.
41. City of Passiac v. Patterson Bill Posting, Advertising, and Sign Painting Co.(1905) 72 N. J. L. 285, 67 Atl. 267; Dobbins v. Los Angeles (1904) 195 U. S. 223.
The point is also discussed in: Ex parte Quong Wo, (1911) 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714;
Mugler v. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623; Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S. 412.
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police regulation does not violate the equality provision in the federal
constitution."'
Changes in the social, economic, and political conditions within the
state make further extension of the police power reasonable and con-
stitutional. It has been well said that "Law is a progressive science."
What is reasonable under one set of conditions and needs may be wholly
unreasonable under different conditions. In Block V. HirshO Justice
Holmes said: "Plainly circumstances may so change in time or so differ
in space ..... as to clothe with a public interest what at other times or in
other places would be a matter of purely private concern." It is because
of the meaning of the word "reasonable" that the courts have been able
to uphold as constitutional the further application of the police power to
the new situations that arise in a changing society. Courts have re-
peatedly held that the police power exists to protect or further the public
welfare or the public good. The terms "public welfare" and "public
good" are general in meaning and as is true of the word "reasonable,"
offer considerable latitude for the expression of the attitude, or viewpoint
of the court deciding a particular case. A conservative court would have a
much narrower view of what is reasonable and for the public good than a
court that is progressive, open minded and aware of the advancing needs
of society. So it is the attitude of the courts in a particular jurisdiction
that has had much to do with the fate of zoning regulations.
Zoning represents a further extension of some of the old principles of
regulation of property for public purposes." It is a further encroachment
upon the fundamental concept -regarding individual freedom in respect
to property. It is evident in the light of modern knowledge that our
police regulations regarding public safety, public health, and nuisances,
and the private restrictions in deeds are inadequate to insure in the
greatest measure the public health, safety, and general welfare in modern
cities. The necessity for zoning regulation in behalf of the public welfare
is evident but some courts are inclined to disregard this fact. Zoning
meets the exigencies of the situation because of its comprehensiveness.
All property is regulated in the interest of all the people. We still have
our nuisance laws and our restrictions in deeds for additional protection.
The weight of authority favors the constitutionality of zoning as a
proper exercise of the police power.45 In the cases favoring constitutional-
42. Missouri v. Lewis (1879) 101 U. S. 22; Muller v. Oregon (1908) 208 U. S.
412; People v. Gallagher (1883) 93 New York 438; Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co.
(1902) 184 U. S. 540.
43. (1921) 256 U.S. 135, p. 155.
44. See, Harvard Law Review, XXXVII, pp. 836- 838.
45. Cases favoring constitutionality: Opinion of the Justices, (1920) 234 M ass.
597, 127 N. E. 525; Ielch v. Swasey, (1907) 193 Mass. 364,79 N. E. 745; (1908) 214 U.
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ity the courts have decided that zoning does not violate the due process
and equality provision in either the state or federal constitutions. They
have viewed each particular restriction or classification in the light of
the end sought to be attained by the whole ordinance. It is only when
particular restrictions are thus considered that they appear as having a
reasonable connection with the accomplishment of a purpose justifiable
under the police power.
The courts upholding zoning ordinances have concluded that the
general benefits and protection to all property, resulting from regulation
add substantially to the public welfare and that these public benefits j usti-
fy a measure of arbitrariness in a few cases. It is evident that any scheme
as general as a zoning ordinance must be sufficiently detailed in order for
it to accomplish its purpose. It is these detailed provisions that appear
harsh in many cases but it is well settled that "mathematical nicety" is
not practical or necessary under the police power and the courts do not
require it.
A well-reasoned opinion of the relation of zoning regulations to
health, safety, and public welfare is to be found in State ex rel. Civello v.
New Orleans.41 Justice O'Niell said:
"It is sufficient that the Municipal Council could reasonably have
had such considerations in mind (considerations of public health,
safety, comfort, and general welfare). If such condition could have
justified the ordinances, we must assume that they did justify them.
"The attorneys for the appellant have suggested several considera-
tions that might well have prompted the enactment of the ordinances in
question. In the first place, the exclusion of business establishments from
residence districts might enable the municipal government to give better
police protection. Patrolmen's beats are larger, therefore fewer, in
residence neighborhoods than in business neighborhoods. A place of
business in a residence neighborhood furnishes an excuse for any criminal
to go into the neighborhood, where, otherwise, a stranger would be
under the ban of suspicion. Besides, open shops invite loiterers and idlers
to congregate; and the places of such congregations need police protec-
S. 91 (Height restriction only); Lincoln Trust Co. u. Williams Building Corporation,
(1920) 229 N. Y. 313,128 N. E. 209; Ware v. City of Wichita (1923) 113 Kans. 153, 214
Pac. 99; State ex rel. Civello v. New Orleans (and cases following) (1923) 154 La. 271
287, 290, 97 So. 440; Boland v. Compagne (1923) 154 La. 470, 97 So. 661; State ex rel.
Carter v. Harper, (1923) 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451; Palmer v. Mann, (1923)
198 N. Y. S. 548, 201 N. Y. S. 525; Cliffside Park Realty Co. v. Borough of Cliffside
(1921) 96 N. J.L. 278,114 At. 797; Schait v. Senior, (1922) 97 N. J. L. 390, 117
At. 517; Cohen v. Rosedale Realty Co. (1923) 199 N. Y. S. 4. See also dissanting
opinion of Judge White in State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. Mc Kelvey, (1923)
301 Mo. 1,256 S. W. 474.
46. (1923) 154 La. 271, p. 2 82 , 97 So. 440.
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tion. In the second place, the zoning of a city into residence districts
and commercial districts is a matter of economy in street paving. Heavy
trucks, hauling freight to and from places of business in residence dis-
tricts, require the city to maintain the same costly pavement in such
districts that is required for business districts; whereas, in the residence
districts, where business establishments are excluded a cheaper pave-
ment serves the purpose. It is pointed out, too, that the fire hazard is
greater in the neighborhood of business establishments than it is in
residence districts. A better and more expensive fire department-better
equipment and younger and stronger men-are needed in the business
centers where the building are taller, than in the residence districts .......
"Places of business are noisy; they are apt to be disturbing at night;
some of them are malodorous; some are unsightly; some are apt to
breed rats, mice, roaches, flies, ants, etc."
The case involved oAe of several block ordinances that restricted
certain districts to residential use only, and was not a case arising under
a comprehensive zoning ordinance; but somewhat the same principles
are involved.
- A few cases hold that zoning is not within the constitutional scope
of the police power. 47 With the exception of the Missouri decision which
will be discussed later, the cases holding zoning unconstitutional are
limited to those in which a specific piece of property or a single provision
of a zoning ordinance was involved. Clearly, these courts have taken an
illogical attitude when they disregard the practical necessity and the
expediency of zoning in general and declare an entire ordinance void
because a single provision when considered alone seems arbitrary and
unreasonable.
The authorities are divided as to the constitutionality of ordinances
placing restrictions on specific blocks or districts when there is no com-
prehensive zoning ordinance.4 8 The "equal protection" and "due process"
47. These cases are: State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. Mc Kelvey, supra; City of
St. Louis v. Evraiff, (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489; State ex rel. Better Building
Home and Mortgage Co. v. Mc Kelvey, (1923) 301 Mo. 130, 256 S. AT. 495; .4mbler
Realty Co. v. Euclid Village, (1924) 21 Ohio Law B. and Rep. 607; Ignaciunas v.
Risley, (1923) 121 Ad. 783, affirmed May, 1924, by N. J. Ct. of Errors and Appeals;
State ex rel. Westminster Presbyterian Church v. Edgecomb, (1922) 108 Neb. 859, 189
NSL WV. 617.
48. A few cases hold it proper under the police power: Ex parte luong JPo.
(1911) 161 Cal. 220, 118 Pac. 714; Brown v. City of Los Aingeles (1920) 183 Cal. 783,
192 Pac. 716; Ex parte Hadacheck (1913) 165 Cal. 416, 132 Pac. 584; Manhattan Oil
Co. v. City of Des Moines (1922), 193 Ia. 1096, 188 N. IV. 921; Salt Lake City v.
Western Foundry and Stove Repair Wks., (1920) 55 Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829. See also
La. case cited, supra note 46.
Contra:
Levy v. Mravlag, (1911) 96 N. J. L. 367, 115 Ad. 350;, People ex rel. Friend v. Chicago
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clauses of the state and federal constitutions are often successfully
invoked to attack these ordinances. It is clear that block ordinances
standing alone appear much more arbitrary and discriminatory than
when they are a part of a general scheme. Questions concerning statutory
and charter powers often play an important role in this class of cases.
Where an ordinance provides that a certain per cent of the property
owners in a block may authorize a change in the uses of property in that
block the question of unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority
arises.
Certain provisions of zoning ordinances give rise to constitutional
questions. It is well settled that a party injured by a police regulation is
not entitled to compensation. Constitutional difficulties are avoided by
having the ordinance take effect in the future, thus avoiding a retroactive
effect. A striking exception is presented in the case of Hadacheck v.
Sebastian.45 Here Hadacheck had erected his brick yard and kiln in an
uninhabited region several miles outside the city of Los Angeles. Later
the city's boundaries took in this territory and Hadacheck was forced to
move his yards at a great loss because a city ordinance restricted the use
of that territory to residential use only. The courts upheld the ordinance
as proper under the police power and Hadacheck was not allowed com-
pensation. Set-back provisions or building line provisions present an
interesting Constitutional question regarding equality and due process.
There is authority that they are unconstitutional when they are not a
part of a comprehensive zone plan."0 No case involving this point seems
to have arisen under a comprehensive zoning ordinance.
In some of the cases the argument is advanced that zoning is provided
under the guise of the police power for purely aesthetic purposes. There
is authority to the effect that the police power cannot be exercised for
such purpose.51 But where the motive of beautification is only inciden-
(1913) 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609; Romar Realty Co. v. Heddonfield, (1921) 96 N. J. L.
117, 114 At. 248; Clements v. McCabe (1920) 210 Mich. 207, 177 N. W. 722; Spann
v. City of Dallas, (1921) 111 Tex. 350, 235 S. W. 513; Calvo v. New Orleans, (1915)
136 La. 480, 67 So. 338. This case was overruled in State ex rel. Civello v. City of
New Orleans (1923) 154 La. 271, 97 So. 440.
49. (1915) 165 Cal. 416; 239 U. S. 394.
50. See St. Louis v. Hill, (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861; People ex rel. Dilzer
v. Calder, (1903) 89 App. Div. 503, 85 N. Y. Supp. 1015; Eubank u. City of Richmond
(1910) 110 Va. 749,67 S. E:376; (1912) 226 U. S. 137.
51. See City of Passiac v. Patterson Bill Posting and Sign Painting Co. (1905)
72 N. J. L. 285, 62 At. 267; Crawford v. Topeka (1893) 51 Kans. 756, 33 Pac. 476;
Commonwealth v. Boston Adoertising Co. (1905).188 Mass. 348, 74 N. E. 601; People
v. Green (1903) 85 App. Div. 400, 83 N. Y. Supp. 460. As to the relation of beauty to
public purpose see: Shoemaker v. U. S. (1892) 147 U. S. 282; U. S. U. Gettysburg
Elec. Ry. Co. (1896) 160 U. S. 668; Att'y General v. Williams, (1889) 174 Mass. 476,
55 N. E. 77.
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tally present as is the case with most zoning ordinances, the ordinance
is not invalid because the additional "aesthetic ingredient" is present.-
There is a marked tendency on the part of the Federal Supreme
Court to sustain state court decisions upholding police regulations where
alegislative discretion has been reasonably exercised. We have no decision
from the highest court of the land on the constitutionality of a compre-
hensive zoning scheme, but the United States Supreme Court has sus-
tained a general height regulation in Welch v. Swasey3 and has upheld
use regulations in Hadacheck v. Sebastian'4 and Rienman v. Little Rock, 
cases- involving strictly zoning principles. Hence, we may hazard a
prediction that it will consider the matter favorably when it is properly
presented.
C. Zoning Under Eminent Domain
Eminent domain is the power of the state to take private property
for a public purpose upon making just compensation. It is an inherent
sovereign power qualified by the provisions of the constitution. States
may further restrict it by their own constitutions. 5
It is desirable that zoning be secured under the police power rather
than by eminent domain because of the inherent difficulties that would
be encountered if only the latter power could be used in zoning. Eminent.
domain would require that proper notice be given in due form to each
interested party, and that each party be given a hearing so that he could
present his claim for damages. Whether these claims resulted in the
awarding of damages or not, great loss in both time and money would
result. Every substantial change in the zoning regulations would necessi-
tate a repetition of the legal processes. Modifications to meet changed
conditions would be discouraged and stereotyped zoning would be the
result. The good features of zoning could not be realized under such
difficulties.
Two states, Nebraska and Wisconsin, passed statutes authorizing
zoning under eminent domain, with the provision that damages that
52. St. Louis Poster A4do. Co. o. St. Louis (1919) 249 U. S. 269; Opinion of the
Justices, (1920) 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525; Welch v. Swasey, (1909) 214 U. S.
91; Cochran v. Preston (1908) 108 Md. 220, 70 Ad. 113; dyer v. Comr on Hgs. of
Bldgs. in Boston (1922) 242 Mass. 30, 136 N. E. 338.
53. (1909) 214U. S.91.
54. (1915) 239 U. S. 394.
55. (1913) 107 Ark. 174,155 S. NV. 105; (1915) 237 U. S. 171.
56. As to the nature of the power, see the following: Chicago, B. & O. R. R.
Co. v. Chicago, (1896) 166 U. S. 226; People v. AIdirondack Ry. Co. (1899) 160 N. Y.
225, 54 N. E. 689; Opinion of the Justices (1910) 204 Mass. 607, 91 N. E. 405; Long
Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn. (1897) 166 U. S. 685; Clark v. Nash (1905)
198 U. S. 361.
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resulted should be assessed against those benefitted.57 But these have
been replaced and zoning is now provided under the police power in each
of these states. 8 There are cases holding that restrictions as to use or
height in the nature of zoning restrictions are proper under the eminent
domain power.59
There is a nice question presented as to whether such regulatory
restrictions amount to a taking. The Ohio Supreme Court in Pontiac
Improvement Co. v. Board of Commonwealth held that these restrictions
did not constitute a taking for public use.60 The question as to what
constitutes a taking is a matter that each state may deal with differently
by statutes or by constitutional provisions interpreted by its courts.
We would expect to find conflicts in the decisions on this point. But if
we hold that zoning regulations can be justified under eminent domain,
the regulations must be imposed for a public purpose. If a public purpose
is sufficiently present to justify eminent domain, no peculiar state con-
stitutional limitations or extensions of the power of eminent domain or
the state police power being present, it is because the zoning regulations
tend to accomplish a purpose for which the police power exists-to
promote health, safety, morals, order, or the general welfare. This
matter is of especial importance to the advocates of zoning in Missouri,
since the Missouri Supreme Court has held"' in a case involving the
constitutionality of the St. Louis zoning ordinance, that the regulations
and restrictions sought to be imposed were not constitutionally justifiable
under the police power, but the majority of the court strongly intimates
that they would have been proper under eminent domain. 2 So far, no
large American city has attempted a zoning plan under eminent domain.
It is true that certain necessary undertakings such as street widening
and excess condemnation, the establishment of municipal parks,
playgrounds, etc., and general city improvements, to insure the full
accomplishment of zoning purposes, may necessitate the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, but there seems to be no just reason for the
apparent failure of some courts to properly distinguish between the
scope and inherent nature of this power and the police power.
57. Laws of Nebraska (1915) Ch. 213, secs. 4-9; Nebraska Metropolitan Cities
(1919) Ch. 185; Wisconsin Laws (1913) Ch. 456, 457; Wisconsin Cities (1917) Ch.
404, stat. (1921) secs. 62, 23, subd. 5, 6.
58. State ex rel. Carterv. Harper(1923) 182 Wis. 148, 196 N. W. 451.
59. Kansas City v. Liebi, (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404; tt'y General v.
Williams (1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77; State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. and Invest-
ment Co:v. Houghton (1919) 144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885.
60. (1922) 104 Ohio 447, 135 N. E. 635.
61. State ex rel. Penrose Investment Co. v. Mc Kelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256
S. W. 474.
62. Discussion of case is reserved for a later chapter.
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III
THE PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE LAW OF
ZONING IN MISSOURI
A. In General
It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that the great weight of
authority upholds the constitutionality of zoning as a proper exercise
of the police power and that theprinciples of zoning are becoming well es-
tablished in the American system ofjurisprudence. In Missouri, however,
the Supreme Court has materially restricted zoning as an exercise of the
police power.0 The legal status of zoning in Missouri can best be under-
stood after a careful study of the decisions on zoning and other cases in
which questions relative to the constitutionality of zoning have arisen.
These decisions were influenced largely by the iiterpretations the
courts placed upon certain constitutional and statutory provisions.
*B. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions Affecting Zoning
in Missouri
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution provides:"
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without dueprocess of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The constitution and laws of Missouri
are subject to this provision. It is a decided check on the arbitrary taking
or the unreasonable regulation of property. Zoning laws that violate
this provision are void.
The Missouri Constitution provides: "That no private property
can be taken for private use, with or without compensation, unless by
the consent of the owner, except for private ways of necessity, and ex-
cept for drains and ditches across the lands of others for agricultural and
sanitary purposes, in such manner as may be prescribed by law; and
that whenever an attempt is made to take private property for a use'
alleged to be public, the question whether the contemplated use be
really public shall be a judicial question, and as such judicially determined
without regard to any legislative assertion that the use is public.""5
It further provides "That private property shall not be taken or dam-
aged for public use without just compensation,"" and, "That no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
'63. State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. et al. v. Mc Kelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W.
474; St. Louis v. Evraiff, (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489; State ex rel. Better Built
Home and Mortgage Co. v. Mc Kelvey, (1923) 301 Mo. 130, 256 S. W. 495.
64. 14th Amendment, Par. 1.
65. Mo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 20.
66. Mo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 21.
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law.""7 These provisions will be discussed later in connection with the
cases. It suffices to state here that they offer additional protection to
private property from governmental interference. The interpretation
that certain earlier cases placed upon the damage clause in the eminent
domain provision quoted above seems to have been largely responsible
for the attitude the Missouri Supreme Court has taken toward zoning as
an exercise of the police power.
Zoning in Missouri has been undertaken either under special grants
of power, as in the case of St. Louis," or under the two laws passed in
1921.9 These laws provided in substance that cities within the classes
designated should thereafter have power to adopt zoning regulations
restricting the height, area, and use of buildings in the interest "of the
public health, safety, convenience, comfort, prosperity, or general wel-
fare." These acts contained no provision for compensation. Thus far
these statutes of 1921 have not been interpreted by the State Supreme
Court although judge Graves in his opinion in State ex rel. Better Built
Home and Mortgage Co. v. Davis et al. said that zoning under the act
approved April 1, 1921, Laws 1921, p. 481, would be void for the reasons
given in the zoning cases.71 Zoning under the special act for St. Louis
was declared unconstitutional in 1923.11 The State Supreme Court's
rulings against the validity of the St. Louis zoning ordinance were a
great blow to zoning in Missouri. Advocates of zoning hoped that the
constitutional convention of 1922-23, would include a provision to
offset the effect of those rulings. "At the special election on February 26,
1924, the voters of Missouri ratified six and rejected fifteen of the twenty-
one constitutional amendments submitted by the constitutional con-
67. Mo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 30.
68. St. Louis City charter 1914, Art. I, delegating the state's police power to the
city, provides that the city shall have power:
"Section 25. To define and prohibit, abate, suppress, and prevent or license and
regulate all acts, practices, conduct, business, occupations, callings, trades, uses of
property and all other things whatsoever detrimental or liable to be detrimental to the
health, morals, comfort, safety, convenience, or welfare of the inhabitants of tile
city and all nuisances and causes thereof.
"Section 26. To prescribe limits within which business, occupations and prac-
tices i;'b-- to be nuisances or detrimental to the health, morals, security, or general
welfare of the people may lawfully be established, conducted, or maintained.
"Section 35. To exercise all powers granted or not prohibited to it by law which
it would be competent for this charter to enumerate."
69. Laws, 1921, pp. 177-180, secs. 1-9, applies to cities with population of not
less than 200,000 and not more than 600,000. Laws of Missouri, 1921, pp. 481-484,
secs. 1-8, applies to cities with a population of 50,000 or less.
70. (1924) 259 S. W. 80. This was an original proceeding in prohibition and
Judge Graves' statement was dictum.
71. State ex rel. Penrose Inv. Co. v. Mc Kelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474;
St. Louis v. Evraiff (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489; State ex rel. Better Built Home
and Mortgage Co. v. Mc Kelvey (1923) 301 Mo. 130, 256 S. W. 495.
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vention."72 Of the fifteen amendments rejected, one contained a section
providing that every city should have the power to adopt zoning regu-
lations as should be provided by general law.73 Since the section relating
to zoning comprised only a small part of one amendment, zoning did not
become a distinct issue and the amendment was rejected for other rea-
sons.
The Missouri legislature during its 1925 session passed a zoning-
enabling act,7 4 patterned after the model drawn up by the Federal
Department of Commerce at Washington. The bill as originally drawn
applied to "all incorporated cities, towns, and villages" but the Senate
amended it so as to apply only in counties having a population of fifty
thousand inhabitants or more.
The bill authorizes zoning under the police power. Great care was
used in drawing the bill to avoid all constitutional inhibitions upon its
enforcement. The provisions of the act were summarized in its tide as
follows: "An act authorizing the legislative body of all incorporated
-cities, towns and villages, for the purpose of promoting health, safety,
morals or the general welfare of the community, to regulate and restrict
by ordinance the height, number of stories and size of all buildings and
other structures, the percentage of lot that may be occupied, the size of
yards, courts and open spaces, the density of population, and the loca-
tion and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, resi-
dence or other purposes; to divide such municipalities into districts of
such number, shape and area as may be deemed best suited to carry
.out the purposes of this act; to regulate and restrict the erection, con-
struction, reconstruction, alteration or use of buildings, structures or
land therein; to provide for the appointment of a zoning commission;
to provide for the adoption of comprehensive zoning plans; to provide
for the change of such regulations, restrictions, and boundaries of zones;
to provide for a board of adjustment; the taking of testimony and ob-
jections and rulings thereon; to provide for the taking of appeals to
circuit courts from the rulings or decisions of the board of adjustment;
to provide the method of procedure and for other purposes, and repealing
-all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act."
As indicated above, an amendment provided that the act should not
apply "to counties having a population of less than fifty thousand in-
72. Loeb, Am. Political Science Rev., XVIII, p. 329.
73. Sec. 27, of proposed Amendment XI, dealing with counties, towns, and
-villages, provided: "Every city shall have the power to provide for the division of the
territory within its boundaries into zones or districts and for the regulation and
-restrctions in the use of the land and structures within such zones or districts to the
.extent and in the manner provided by general law."
74. Laws, 1925, p. 307.
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habitants." The bill was approved by the Governor and went into ef-
fect on July 9, 1925.
C. Judicial Decisions Affecting the Law of Zoning in Missouri.
Before discussing the zoning cases it is desirable to review the
decisions in certain earlier Missouri cases that apparently have become
landmarks in the development of the public law of Missouri relative to
the imposition of legal restrictions on the use of private property. These
cases establish in the main the precedents that influenced the Supreme
Court in its decisions on zoning. The case of City of St. Louis v. Hill",
was the first of these cases. In 1891 the Missouri Legislature passed
what is known as the Boulevard Law. 7 The law authorized all cities in
Missouri having a population of three hundred thousand inhabitants
or more, or which should thereafter reach said population, to establish
by ordinance boulevards and provide for maintaining the same and to
establish building lines along said boulevards to which all buildings and
structures thereon should conform. By virtue of the power acquired
under the Boulevard Law St. Louis passed an ordinance"7 designating a
certain public highway as Forest Park Boulevard. The ordinance es-
tablished building lines of forty feet along the boulevard. Neither the
Boulevard Law nor the ordinance contained any provision for compen-
sating those whose property would be damaged by the enforcement of
the building line restrictions. Hill was found guilty and fined in a lower
court for violating this ordinance by building on his lot within the forty-
foot line. He appealed his case to the Missouri Supreme Court. There he
contended that both the state law and the ordinance were unconstitu-
tional and void. He said that the establishment by law of a building
line of forty feet amounted to a damaging and taking of private property
within the meaning of sections 21 and 30,7s of Article II, of the Missouri
Constitution and that by said sections private property could be taken or
damaged only for a public purpose upon just compensation being made.
The city answered that there was no taking of property but merely a
75. (1893) 116Mo. 527,22S. W. 861.
76. Laws, 1891, p. 47, provided: "Section 1. All cities in Missouri having a
population of three hundred thousand inhabitants or more, or which shall hereafter
reach said population, are hereby authorized and empowered to establish by ordinance
boulevards and provide for maintaining the same; and may regulate traffic thereon..
. and may establish building lines to which all buildings and structures thereon
shall conform ........
77. St. Louis Ordinance No. 16450, sec. 1, described and named a certain
public highway as "Forest Park Boulevard." Sec. 4 provided: "All houses or buildings
hereafter to be erected on said Forest Park Boulevard shall conform to uniform build-
ing lines, which building lines shall be forty feet distant from a parallel with the north
and south lines of said Forest Park Boulevard, respectively." Sec. 4a provided a
penalty for the violation of this ordinance.
78. These sections are quoted, supra.
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beneficial regulation of the property. The court held that since the use
is one of the most essential and important attributes of property, a
restriction on the lawful use amounts to a taking and damaging within
the meaning of sections 21 and 30, of Article II, of the Missouri Consti-
. tution, for which compensation is due, and that since both the law and
the ordinance failed to provide for compensation they violated said
sections of the Missouri Constitution and were void. The court did not
consider the ordinance as a police regulation. They based their decision
on general principles regarding eminent domain, established in earlier
Missouri cases.79 Again in St. Louis v. Dorr et aL8 o the court was called
upon to consider the constitutionality of a St. Louis ordinance8 t which
purported to restrict a portion of Washington Boulevard to residential
use only, without making compensation for damages resulting from this
restriction. The court held in the opinion handed down by Judge Bar-
clay that the ordinance was invalid because the act- of the state legisla-
ture which alone gave the city the power to provide that certain areas
should be used exclusively for residential purposes was a special act passed
in violation of section 53 of Article IV82 of the Missouri Constitution,
hence, was, unconstitutional and void and the city was devoid of power
to make and enforce the ordinance. The question as to whether or not
the ordinance could be sustained as a police regulation (had there been
a sufficient delegation of the state's police power) was not passed upon
by the court. Judges Gantt, Robinson, and Brace, while concurring
in t.he majority opinion that the act of the legislature was unconstitution-
al because it was a special act, gave as an additional reason for affirm-
ance that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it deprived the
defendants of property rights by restricting the uses to which they
could put their property without making just compensation. They relied
on the City of St. Louis v. HillM as authority for that conslusion. Judges
Sherwood and Burgess dissented from the majority view that the law
was a special act and unconstitutional on that ground. They concurred
79. These cases were: Newby v. Platte County (1857) 25 Mo. 258; l'alther a.
Warner (1857) 25 Mo. 277 (these two cases arose under the constitution of 1820);
Provoltv. Chicago, Rock Island and Pac. R. R. Co. (1874) 57 Mo. 256 (case arose under
constitution of 1865); Evans v. The Missouri, Iowa and Nebraska Ry. Co. (1877) 64
Mo. 453; Lowery v. Rainwater (1879) 70 Mo. 152; River Rendering Co. a. Behr (1882)
77 Mo. 91.
80. (1898) 145 Mo. 466,41 S. W. 1094,46 S. W. 976.
81. St. Louis Ordinance No. 16669 (1892).
82. Mo. Boulevard Law, (Laws, 1891, p. 47).
83. Missouri Constitution, Art. IV. Sec. 53, prohibits the passing of any local
or special law "authorizing the laying or opening, altering or maintaining roads,
highways, streets, or alleys" or "incorporating cities, towns or villages, or changing
their charters."
84. (1893) 116 Mo. 527,22S. W. 861.
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in the result that the law was unconstitutional on the ground that it
authorized the city to restrict the lawful use of private property without
providing compensation for damages in violation of sections 21 and 30
of Article II of the Missouri Constitution. They relied on the case of
St. Louis v. Hills5 to sustain that view. Judge Macfarlane concurred in
the opinion as written by Judge Barclay. The case, however, is not
authority for the proposition that the police power cannot be exercised
to regulate and restrict lawful, non-nuisance uses of property, though
five of the seven judges appear to take this position.
The Missouri Supreme Court in St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co.
v. City of St. Louis et al.86 held in a rather lengthy opinion that a St.
Louis ordinance 87 which regulated the height, size and position of bill-
boards on vacant lots within the city of St. Louis was a proper exercise
of the city's police power.8 8 The court held that the ordinance did not
violate the due process provisions of either our State or Federal Consti-
tutions, that it did not violate equal protection as provided for in the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, nor was it a taking
or damaging of private property for a public use for which compensation
must be made under sections 21 and 30 of Article II of the Missouri
Constitution. The Court pointed out that the structure and use of
billboards are such that without regulation they might afford hiding
and lurking places for criminals and thus become a menace to public
safety; they might afford cover for immoral practices to the detriment
of public morals; trash and rubbish have a tendency to accumulate be-
hind them which would endanger public health; billboards may be so
constructed as to add to the fire hazard and that with these consid-
erations in mind the regulations imposed by the ordinance were
reasonable and necessary to promote and protect the public health,
morals, and safety. Judge Graves dissented on the ground that the
85. (1893) 116 Mo. 527, 22S. W. 861.
86. (1911) 235 Mo. 99,137 S. W. 929.
87. St. Louis Ordinance No. 22022 passed Apr. 7, 1905. The ordinance provides
that no billboard of twenty-five square feet or more shall be erected without a permit
and none to extend more than fourteen feet high above the ground. It requires an
open space of four feet to be left between the lower edge and the ground, forbids an
approach of nearer than six feet to any building or to the side of the lot, or nearer than
two feet to any other billboard. With qualifications there must be certain conformity
to the building line. No billboard is to exceed five hundred square feet in area. The
fee for a permit is one dollar for every five lineal feet. The ordinance also regulated
the manner in which signs and fences should be erected.
88. The St. Louis charter (1914) Art. III, sec. 26, par. 5, in substance gave the
city the power to "license, tax, and regulate" all business, and vocations within city.
Par. 14, known as the general welfare clause, further provided that the city could
pass "all ordinances not inconsistent with the provisions of this charter in maintaining
the peace, good government, health," etc.
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ordinance restricted the use of private property for purely aesthetic
purposes. The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
and was there dismissed by agreement, 9 without an opinion being
handed down.
The constitutionality of the St. Louis billboard ordinance was
raised again in the case of St. Louis Poster Advertising Co. v. St. Louis.00
The plaintiffs exerted great effort to prove that their billboards were
not so constructed as to endanger health, morals or the public safety.
The company contended that the ordinance regulating billboards could
not be sustained as a proper exercise of the police power because in the
particular case the regulations had no reasonable relation to the pro-
tection of public health, morals, and safety. It was argued further that
since the ordinance could not be sustained as a police power measure
its enforcement would amount to a taking of private property in viola-
tion of Sections 21 and 30 of Article II of the Missouri Constitution and
of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to our Federal Constitution.
The court in accord with the decision handed down in the St. Louis
Gunning Advertising Company case upheld the ordinance. Judge Graves
dissented for the reasons given in St. Louis Gunning Advertising Co. v.
St. Louis.9o The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court
where the decision of the Missouri Supreme Court was affirmed."-
The cases of St. Louis Gunning Advertising Comnpany v. St. LouisO
and St. Louis Poster Advertising Company v. St. Louis" firmly establish
the law in Missouri that billboards may be regulated under the state's
police power. The attitude taken in these cases is hardly in accord with
the decision in State ex rel. Penrose Investment Comnpany v. Mc Kelvey9
which will be discussed later.
In the case of St. Louis v. Dreisoerner,96 the defendant had been
found guilty and fined in a lower court for operating a manufacturing
plant within 600 feet of Tower Grove Park in violation of a St. Louis
ordinance. The Supreme Court held that the ordinance forbidding the
maintenance of a manufacturing plant of any size within 600 feet of the
park was an unwarranted exercise of the police power, unreasonable on
its face, and if applied to the defendant's business-that of making
wooden articles--it would deprive him of the full use of his property
89. (1913) 231 U. S. 761.
90. (1917) 195 S. W. 717.
91. (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929.
92. (1919) 249 U. S. 269. Accord: Cusack Co. v. Chicago (1917) 242 U. S. 526;
Kansas City Gunning Ido. Co. v. Kansas City (1912) 240 Mo. 659, 144 S. XV. 1099.
93. (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. V. 929.
94. (1917) 195 S. XV. 717; affirmed (1919) 249 U. S. 269.
95. (1923) 301 Mo. 1, 256 S. W. 474.
96. - (1912) 243 Mo. 217, 147 S. NV. 998.
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without compensation and without due process. The decision is in
accord with St. Louis v. Packing Co.,97 holding that St. Louis had no
power to declare by ordinance anything to be a nuisance which is not a
nuisance at common law. The ordinance was very arbitrary and un-
reasonable and the decision is sound.
In Kansas City v. Liebi et al.,9 s the court held that a Kansas City
ordinance, 9 restricting a portion of Gladstone Boulevard to residential
use and also establishing a thirty-five foot building line along the sides of
the street (compensation for all damages being given and said compen-
sation to be raised by special assessment against the benefitted area) was
constitutional. The court pointed out that the regulations imposed
restricted the lawful use of property which amounted to a taking and
damaging within the meaning of section 211'1 of Article II of the Missouri
Constitution but the court overruled the contention of the defendants
that it was a taking for a private purpose in violation of section 20101
of Article II of that instrument and in violation of the due process clause
in the Fourteenth Amendment to our Federal Constitution. The court
said that thecity bystatute had beengiven the power to exercise the pow-
er of eminent domain and thatsince the ordinance under review was passed
in the interest of health, safety, morality, general enjoyment, and educa-
tion it was a taking for a public purpose. The court took the view that
the term "public use", or "public purpose" is of a flexible nature capable
of being adapted to the needs as they arise in a changing social and
economic order. Reference was made to the exercise of the power of
eminent domain for public parks, play grounds, libraries, museums and
many other undertakings, indicating the historical expansion of the
term "public use." The court agreed further that the mere fact that the
immediate advantage of an undertaking inures to the benefit of a small
group does not deprive the undertaking of its public character when the
public is the recipient of many indirect benefits."" The court cited the
case of Welch v. Swasey,0 3 holding constitutional a Massachusetts statute
limiting the height of buildings in a certain part of Boston to one height
97. (1897) 141 Mo. 375, 42 S. W. 954.
98. (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404.
99. Kansas City Ordinance No. 39946. The ordinance provided that it should
not be repealed within 20 years except upon petition of a majority of the owners of
private property upon the boulevard and within the benefit district.
100. This section provides: "That private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use withoutjust compensation."
101. This section provides: "That no private property can be taken for private
use, with or without compensation, unless by the consent of the owner, except .......
102. The court referred to language used in the cases of St. Louis v. Hill (1893)
116 Mo. 527, 22 S. W. 861, and St. Louis v. Dorr (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094,
46 S. W. 976, as authority for this proposition.
103. (1907) 193 Mass. 364,79N. E. 745; (1909) 214U. S. 91.
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and to another height in another part of the city. The court in that case
overruled the contention that the police power was being exercised
for purely private aesthetic purposes. The majority in Kansas City 0.
Liebi also relied on the cases of Attorney-General v. J1iliams C and State v.
Houghton °5 the former upholding a Massachusetts statute limiting the
height of buildings around Copley Square in Boston, compensation for
damages being given, and the latter holding a Minnesota statute con-
stitutional which provided that in cities of the first class certain areas
should be used exclusively for residential purposes. The courts in each of
the cases ruled that the public interest justified the exercise of the power
of eminent domain. Holt, J., in State v. Hougldton rendered an eminently
sound opinion.
Judge Walker dissented in Kansas City v. Liebi on the ground that
the city ordinance authorized private property to be condemned and
taxed for purely private and aesthetic purposes in violation of sections 20
and 30 of Article II of the Missouri Constitution and of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. It appears that Judge Walker
conceives "public use" to imply "possession, occupation, and enjoyment
of the land by the public at large or by public agencies," and he would
not extend it to quasi-public control in the form of regulation. Judge
David Blair concurred in Judge Walker's opinion. The case of Kansas
City v. Liebi did not involve a comprehensive zoning ordinance but the
rulings in that case seem to form the basis for the majority opinion in the
later zoning cases.
State ex rel. Penrose Investment Company et al v. A fcKelvey' 05 was
the first comprehensive zoning case decided by the Missouri Supreme
Court. An original proceeding in mandamus was brought by the state
on behalf of the relators against McKelvey, building commissioner of the
City of St. Louis, to require him to issue a building permit. The relators
owned the lot upon which they desired to erect a building in which an
electrically driven ice manufacturing plant was to be installed and
conducted. Compliance with all ordinances, except the zoning ordinance
number 30199, approved July 15, 1918, and the observance of all formal
requirements prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit were
alleged. The respondent defended on the ground that the relators had
failed to comply with the requirements of the zoning ordinance, particu-
larly sections 2, 3, 6, 7, and 29.117 It was pointed out that the zoning
104. (1899) 174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77.
105. (1920) 144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885.
106. (1923) 301 Mo. 1,256 S. NV. 474.
107. The following sections of the St. Louis zoning ordinance were involved in
the zoning cases.
"Section Two.-In order to designate, regulate and restrict the location of
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ordinance classified the district in which the relators sought to install
their plant as a "second residence district", and that the proposed use
was prohibited by said ordinance.
The relators answered that the zoning ordinance was unconsti-
tutional and void for several reasons. First, they said that the ordinance
authorized the taking of private property for a proposed public use
without making just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
commerce, business, trades and industries and the location of all buildings designed
or occupied for specified uses, the city of St. Louis is hereby divided into five districts
which shall be known as: (a) first residence district; (b) second residence district;
(c) commercial district; (d) industrial district; and (e) unrestricted district. The City
of St. Louis is hereby divided into the five classes of districts aforesaid, and the
boundaries of the districts are shown upon the map attached hereto and made a
part of this ordinance, being designated as 'Use Zone Map', and said map and all
the notations, references and other things shown thereon shall be as much a part of this
ordinance as if the matters and things set forth by said map were all fully described
herein.
"Section Three-Except as hereinafter provided, the use or uses of all buildings
and premises existing at the time of the adoption of this ordinance may be continued.
Except as hereinafter provided, no building now existing and no building hereafter
erected shall be occupied, or altered for occupancy, for a specified use in a district
restricted against such use, as shown on the map hereinabove mentioned.
"Section Six-All land and buildings in the second residence district except
as hereinafter provided shall be erected for and used exclusively as dwellings, tene-
ments, hotels, lodging and boarding houses, churches, private clubs, hospitals or sani-
tariums, public or semi-public institutions of an educational, philanthropic elee-
mosynary nature, railroad passenger station and the usual accessories located in the
same lot or plot with these various buildings, including the office of a physician,
dentist or other persons authorized by law to practice medicine and including private
garage containing space for not more than four automobiles; provided, however,
that no tenement, hotel, lodging or boarding house shall hereafter be erected, main-
tained or conducted except as provided in Section Three in this ordinance in any
second residence district occupied exclusively by one and two family residences,
without the unanimous consent of the Board of Public Service after public hearing,
duly advertised, has been held thereon. Farming, truck gardening, nurseries or
greenhouses may be erected and maintained in second residence districts.
"Section Seven-All land and buildings in commercial districts as shown upon
the map hereinabove mentioned shall be erected for and used as a store or shop for
the conduct of a wholesale or retail business, a place of amusement, an office or
offices, police or fire department station house, post office, studios, conservatories,
dancing academies, carpenter shop, cleaning and dyeing works, painting, paper
hanging and decorating stores, dressmaker, laundry, millinery store, photograph
gallery, plumbing shop, roofing or plastering establishment, tailor, tin-smith, under-
taker, upholsterer and other similar enterprises or institutions, and also any use
permitted in the first and second residence districts; provided, however, that no
building shall have more than fifty per cent of the floor area devoted to industry or
storage purposes incidental to its primary use, and provided that not more than five
employes shall be engaged in any trade or industry which shall be incidental or essen-
tial to the primary use. A telephone exchange, electric sub-station, or car barn may
be established in the commercial district upon permit being issued therefor by the
Board of Public Service where such a structure will not be detrimental to or tend to
change the character of the neighborhood. The Board of Public Service may issue
a permit for the establishing of a public garage in a residential or commercial district
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ment to the Federal Constitution. Second, they contended that the
ordinance was not a proper exercise of the police power because it was
arbitrary, unreasonable and not of uniform application throughout
St. Louis; that it was not a constitutional exercise of the power of eminent
domain as it was without provision for just compensation; hence, it
violated the due process clause and the uniformity clause of section 1
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Third,
they argued that the ordinance violated sections 21 and 30 of Article II
of the Missouri Constitution by permitting private property to be
"taken" and "damaged for public use without just compensation," and
that it authorized the taking of private property without due process of
law. Considerable stress was laid on the proposition that the contem-
plated use was not a nuisance per se or potential and since the proposed
use was lawful the constitutional provisions referred to above prohibit
its restriction in the rianner set out. by the zoning ordinance.
It was contended on behalf -of the City that the ordinance was
reasonable and necessary in the light of existing economic and social
conditions in St. Louis to protect and to promote public health, safety,
morals, and general good; that it was a proper exercise of the City's
police power and not a violation of the provisions of the Missouri and
Federal Constitutions set out by the relators. Issue was joined on the
constitutional points mentioned.
A careful reading of the majority opinion written by Judge Walker
fails to make clear just what was the basis of the decision. Much space is
used to show that the City of St. Louis was acting in excess of the police
power granted in the charter of 1914,101 and this appears to be the real
ground for holding the ordinance invalid. Subsequently in the same
opinion he intimates that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it
imposes restrictions on the lawful use of property having no relation to
public health, morals, safety, and general welfare, hence, a private use,
and an improper exercise of either the police power or the power of
eminent domain. In support of this latter view he cites his dissenting
upon presentation of a petition duly signed where such structure will not be detri-
mental or tend to change the character of the neighborhood. Such permits shall
specify the maximum size or capacity of the garage and shall impose appropriate
safeguards upon the construction and use thereof.
"Section Twenty-nine--The City Plan Commission may of its own initiative or
upon petition duly signed and acknowledged by the owners of fifty per cent of the
property in any given district or part thereof, cause to be prepared and introduced
an ordinance altering the height, area or use restrictions herewith or subsequently
established for such district or part thereof as may be deemed affected by such
change. Appeal from the decision of the City Plan Commission on all petitions may
be taken to the Board of Public Service."
108. Quoted, supra, note 88.
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opinion in Kansas City v. Liebi and the opinion of Commissioner Higbee
in City of St, Louis v. Evraiff, 09 an opinion involving the constitutionality
of the same ordinance under review in the Penrose case but which had
not yet been handed down. Chief Justice Woodson and Judge David E.
Blair concurred in Judge Walker's opinion.
Judge Graves in a separate opinion concurred only in the result.
In substance he said that the use for which St. Louis sought to take
some interest or right in private property by regulation was a public use,
but that such rights could not be taken for public use without just
compensation. He said that eminent domain is but the limited exercise
of the police power; and that the police power could only beused to abate,
suppress or regulate uses of property which, if not regulated, would rise to
the "plane of nuisances" while restrictions on the lawful uses of property
could only be imposed under eminent domain with just compensation.
He seems to have a very conservative view as to the scope of the police
power. Judge Graves intimates that he would have sustained the ordi-
nance had adequate compensation been given.
Judge White wrote a strong dissenting opinion which might well be
sustained upon both reason and authority. He showed conclusively
that St. Louis had been given the power to adopt zoning in the charter of
1914.110 He said that the state's police power is of necessity being ex-
panded to meet the increased social and economic needs, and he cites
much authority both State and Federal to show zoning to be proper under
that power.' He points out how in the light of modern knowledge zoning
is a necessary means of insuring public health, safety, enjoyment, public
economy, and the general good. The following quotation from his opinion
dealing with health, is indicative of the progressive attitude of his reason-
ing:
"There is the matter of health. The state's interference in an indi-
vidual's liberty is not limited, as formerly, to vaccination and quarantine
against contagion. The recent discoveries of medical science show that a
109. (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489. This case had been decided but the
opinion had not yet been handed down.
110. Provisions of the charter are quoted supra, note 88.
111. The following cases formed the basis of Justice White's dissent: Welch v.
Swasey (1909) 214 U. S. 91; St. Louis Poster Adu. Co. v. St. Louis (1919) 249 U. S.
269; St. Louis Gunning Adu. Co. v. St. Louis (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929;
Ware u. Wichita (1923) 113 Kans. 153, 214 Pac. 99; Palmerv. Mann (1923) 198 N. Y.
S.548; City of Utica v. Hanna (1922) 202 App. Div. 610, 195 N. Y. S. 225; City of
Des Moines o. Manhattan Oil Co. (1922) 193 Ia. 1096, 188 N. W. 921; Opinion of
the Justices (1920) 234 Mass. 597, 127 N. E. 525; Atty.-Gen. v. Williams et al. (1899)
174 Mass. 476, 55 N. E. 77; Cliffside Park Realty Co. v. Borough (1921) 96 N. J. L.
278, 114 At. 797; Schait v. Senior (1922) 97 N. J. L. 390, 117 Atd. 517; Knack v.
Scrap Iron Co. (1922) 219 Mich. 573, 189 N. W. 54; State ex rel v. Houghton (1919)
144 Minn. 1, 174 N. W. 885.
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thousand perils, unsuspected a generation ago, swarm in the atmos-
phere of a busy street. For instance, the poisonous gas from the exhaust
of a gasoline engine is dangerous to health even in the open spaces of
city thoroughfares. Hea.lthful surroundings mean not only freedom from
contagion and poisonous gases, but freedom from disturbing noises and
confusion of traffic and other incidents which disturb the quiet and
peace of one's home. The city planners are better judges of those
matters than the courts."
He shows that the effect of the majority view "instead of protecting
the citizens of St. Louis in the enjoyment of their property rights is to
render the city powerless to protect them;" that the person, the use of
whose property alone is restricted, is considered while the great majority
the enjoyment of whose property required such restriction, are ignored;
that more consideration is given to an alleged private right than to the
public good. Justice White is of the opinion that it is the comprehen-
siveness of the zoning scheme that makes it reasonable. All the property
is regulated in the interest of all the people. According to Judge White
the St. Louis zoning ordinance was reasonable and necessary to the future
development and expansion of that city and St. Louis has the power to
segregate its factories and protect the residence district against the
intrusion of manufacturing establishments. Judges James T. Blair and
Ragland, concurred in the dissent.
The City of St. Louis was not satisfied with the four to three decision.
Three of the judges, Walker, Woodson, and David Blair, held that the
St. Louis charter had given n6power to zone and that the use was private.
judge Graves seemed to favor zoning if carried out under eminent do-
main, while Judges White, James T. Blair, and Ragland had held the
St. Louis ordinance to be proper under the police power. A motion for a
rehearing was heard November 20, 1923.
Judge Graves wrote the majority opinion on the motion for rehear-
ing. In brief, this opinion recites that the City of St. Louis had been given
by its charter the power to adopt zoning but it holds the particular
ordinance invalid because it restricts the use of private property for a
public purpose-the benefits of zoning in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment to the Federal Constitution and of sections 20u and 21' of Article
II of the Missouri Constitution. The public purpose is conceded, and, to
sustain .the proposition that these purposes could not be accomplished
without compensation being given, the majority rely on the cases of St.
Louis v. Hill,113 St. Louis v. Do"r,14 St. Louis v. Dreisoerner,115 and
112. Quoted supra.
113., (1893) 116 Mo. 527,22 S. NV. 861.
114. (1898) 145 Mo. 466, 41 S. W. 1094, 46 S. W. 976.
115. (1912) 243 Mo. 217, 147 S. NV. 998.
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Kansas City v. Liebi."6 As was true of the majority opinion written by
Judge Walker on the original hearing, not a single case involving a
comprehensive zoning ordinance was reviewed or discussed. Judges
Woodson, Walker and David E. Blair appear to have receded somewhat
from the position they took in the opinion on the original hearing and
now concur in the view expressed by Judge Graves. Judge White wrote
a dissenting opinion on the motion for rehearing which emphasizes the
illogical position taken by the majority.
The case of City of St. Louis v. Euraiff et al.117 was decided along
with the original decision in the Penrose case. Since that case involved
practically the same questions relative to the constitutionality of the St.
Louis zoning ordinance as did the Penrose case, it is desirable to note the
rulings in the Evraiff case in order that both cases may be discussed
together. Evraiff and others had established and conducted a rag and
junk yard within a section of St. Louis designated as an industrial
district by the St. Louis zoning ordinance. The ordinance prohibited the
use of property for the storage of rags, junk, etc., in the industrial dis-
tricts as named and described by the ordinance. It was to recover the
penalty for violating this provision of the zoning ordinance that this
action was instituted against Evraiff et al. A demurrer to the action
having been sustained, the city appealed to the Supreme Court.
It was urged on behalf of St. Louis that the provisions of the
ordinance were necessary and reasonable to protect and promote the
public health, morals, safety, and general good and that the zoning
ordinance was a proper exercise of authorized police power. The court
in an opinion written by Commissioner Higbee sustained the views of the
defense and ruled that the zoning ordinance placed arbitrary and un-
reasonable restrictions on the use of private property having no relation
to health, safety, and welfare of the inhabitantsI18 of the city, hence, the
ordinance was not a proper exercise of the city's police power and con-
stituted a violation of due process as provided for in section 30 of Article
II of the Missouri Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution. The opinion also states that the ordinance was
not within the powers delegated to the city. The greater portion of the
authority relied on in the opinion, strange as it may seem, points to a
conclusion directly opposite to the one reached. Judges Woodson, David
116. (1923) 298 Mo. 569, 252 S. W. 404.
117. (1923) 301 Mo. 231, 256 S. W. 489.
118. The Missouri Supreme Court previously held that the city of St. Louis
had power to license and regulate junk dealers under its police power because, besides
being favorable to the disposition of stolen goods, the rags and junk might contain
germs and thus cause a spread of disease. City of St. Louis v. Sam Baskowiz, (1918)
273 Mo. 543, 201 S. W. 870.
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E. Blair and Walker concurred in this opinion. Judge Graves concurred
in the result for the reasons stated in his separate concurring opinion
in the Penrose case. judges White, James T. Blair, and Ragland dis-
sented.
The Missouri Supreme Court in Better Built Home and M ortgage Co.
v. Mc Kelvey cited the Penrose and Evraiff cases and again declared the
St. Louis zoning ordinance void for the reasons given in those cases.,
The case of State ex rel. Better Built Home and Mortgage Co. o. Daisn
involved the question as to whether a writ of prohibition would issue
against the zoning commission of the City of Clayton, Missouri. The
Missouri Supreme Court ruled that the commission was not exercising
judicial functions in holding public hearings on the proposed zoning
ordinance and that the writwouldnotissue. Thecase is of interest because
zoning was being attempted under the enabling act approved April 1,
1921, Laws 1921, p. 481, and the dicta in the case by judges Graves state
that both the law and the ordinance would be invalid unless the law
and the ordinance provided just compensation to those the use of whose
property would be restricted by the zoning ordinance.
A narrow view as to the scope of the police power underlies the
majority ruling in the Penrose and Evraiff cases. There is some dicta
concurred in by Judges Walker, David Blair and Woodson, to the effect
that St. Louis had not been granted the power sought to be exercised;
but these judges later (on the motion for the rehearing of the Penrose
case) acceded to the views of judge Graves that the power had been
granted but that its exercise not being within the police power would
amount to a taking or damaging of private property for a public use and
would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal
Constitution and sections 21 and 30 of Article II of the Missouri Con-
stitution, That conclusion, it seems, can hardly be sustained either by
reason or authority.
It is a well-settled rule of constitutional law that the provision,
"'nor be d'eprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use withoutjust compensa-
tion," in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution constitutes a
limitation upon the Federal Government and in no way restricts state
action.uI The weight of authority also sustains the proposition that the-
119. (1923) 301 Mo. 130,256 S. NV. 495.
120. (1924) 302 Mo. 307,259 S. NV. 80.
121. Hunter v. Pittsburg (1907) 207 U. S. 161; Holden v. Hardy (1898) 169
U. S. 366; Munn v. Ill. (1876) 94 U. S. 113; Davis v. Texas (1891) 139 U. S. 651;
State v. Gordon (1916) 268 Mo. 713, 188 S. W. 160; State v. Parker Distilling Co.
(1911) 237 Mo. 103, 139 S. NV. 453; McGreo v. Mo. Pa. Ry. Co. (1910) 230 Mo.
496, 132 S. W. 1076; also see cases collected 12 C. J. page 1194, note 80.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
destruction of property or the limitation of the use of it under the police
power does not violate "due process" as employed in state constitutions
and in the fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Nor is it
a taking within the meaning of the eminent domain provision of the
Missouri Constitution for which compensation must be made.'
Mr. Justice Brown of the Federal Supreme Court in Holden v.
Hardy,123 p. 391, speaking of the police power said:
"While this power is inherent in all governments, it has doubtless
been greatly expanded in its application during the last century."
It is well settled that a state government may under its police
power impose restrictions on the use of property in the interest of public
health, morals, and safety and it is also well established that the same
restrictions may be imposed upon the use of property in promotion of
the public welfare, convenience, and general prosperity.
The Federal Supreme Court in C. B. and Q. Ry. Co. v. Drainage
Commissioners, 124 p. 592, said: "We hold that the police power of the
state embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience
or the general prosperity, as well as regulations designed to promote
the public health, the public morals or the public safety .........
This principle was quoted with approval in Bacon v. Walker,2 '
where it was said: "It (the police power) extends to so dealing with the
conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest
welfare of its people."
In Noble State Bank v. Haskell,121 the court said: "It may be said
in a general way that the police power extends to all the great public
needs. Camfield v. U. S., 167 U. S. 518. It may be put forth in aid of
what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing morality or strong
and preponderant opinion to be greatly and immediately necessary to
the public welfare."
In Munn v. Illinois"27 at page 124, Chief Justice White said:
"When one becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with
some rights or privileges which, as an individual not affected by his re-
lations to others, he might retain. 'A body politic,' as aptly defined in the
preamble of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 'is a social compact
- 122. Mugler o. Kansas (1887) 123 U. S. 623; Chicago etc. R. R. Co. v. Illinois
(1906) 200 U. S. 561; St. Louis Poster Ado. Co. v. St. Louis (1919) 249 U. S. 269;
St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. u. St. Louis (1911) 235 Mo. 99; 137 S. W. 929; Carson v.
Missouri Ry. Co. (1916) 184 S. W. 1039; Morrison o. Morey (1898) 146 Mo. 543, 48
S. W. 629; Chicago, etc. Ry Co. o. Milwaukee (1897) 97 Wis. 418, 72 N. W. 1118.
123. (1898) 169 U. S. 366.
124. (1906) 200 U. S. 561.
125. (1906) 204 U. S. 311.
126. (1911) 219 U. S. 104 at p. 111.
127. (1876) 94U. S. 113.
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by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen
with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the
common good.' This does not confer power upon the whole people to
control rights which are purely and exclusively private, Thorpe D.
R. & B. R. R. Co., 27 Vt. 143; but it does authorize the establishment of
laws requiring each citizen to so conduct himself, and so use his own
property, as not unnecessarily to injure another. This is the very essence
of government, and has found expression in the maxim sic itere Itto it
alienum non laedas. From this source come the police powers, which, as
was said by Mr. Chief Justice Taney in the License Cases, 5 How. 583,
'are nothing more than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty ..... that is to say ..... the power to govern men and
things.' Under these powers the government regulates the conduct of its
citizens one towards another, and the manner in which each shall use his
own property, when such regulation becomes necessary for the public
good."
In a well reasoned case, State ex rel. Adams u. Burdge m'8 at p. 398,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: "It is that inherent and plenary
power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort and welfare of society." The same court in the trading stamp
cases12 9 at p. 625 also said:
"The law on the subject as embodied in the decided cases shows that
the police power is held to include all those regulations which promote
the general interest and prosperity of the public generally."
In Hailer Sign JJ orks v. Physical Culture School,"2 the Illinois Su-
preme Court p. 439 said:
"The natural right every citizen has to use his property according to
his own will is necessarily subject to the limitation that in such use others
shall not be injured.
"All uses of property or courses of conduct which are injurious to the
health, comfort, safety, and welfare of society may be prohibited under
the sovereign power of the State, even though the exercise of such power
may result in inconvenience or loss to individuals. In this respect indi-
vidual rights must be subordinate to the higher rights of the public.
The power that the State may exercise in this regard is the overruling
law of necessity, and is founded upon the maxim, salus popdi est
suprema lex. The existence and exercise of this power are an essential
attribute of sovereignty and the establishment of government pre-
supposes that the individual citizen surrenders all private rights the
128. (1897) 95 Wis. 390,70 N. W. 347.
129. (1917) 166 Wis. 613,166 N. W. 64.
130. (1911) 249 I. 436, 94N. E. 920.
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exercise of which would prove hurtful to the citizens generally, City of
Chicago v. Rogers Park Water Co., 214 Ill. 212, 73 N. E. 375; Mugler v.
Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. Ed. 205.
"While the general principle above announced is uniformly recog-
nized, it is equally true that the owner of property has the right to make
any use of it he desires that does not endanger or threaten the safety,
health, comfort or general welfare of the public."
The above quotations indicate the line of reasoning that has led the
courts to permit the newer and multiple lines of human endeavor to be
regulated under the police power. This does not signify that our con-
stitutions have been changed or violated. It means that our constitutional
provisions are being interpreted in the light of modern needs and condi-
tions. Law is by necessity in a degree a "progressive science." That the
better reason and weight of authority greatly increases the scope of the
police power is a matter of common knowledge with most courts, State
and Federal.' 3'
It has been repeatedly held that reasonable municipal zoning
with regulations based on health, morals, safety and the general welfare
of the community falls within the widened scope of the police power,
The law is clear that zoning regulations restricting the height, area and
bulk of buildings may be imposed as a public measure, where the pro-
visions of the ordinance are framed so as to have some relation to access
of light and air, fire protection, or facility for fighting fire.132
The subject of use regulation in zoning presents the most difficult
question for the courts but the weight of authority also sustains this
phase of zoning as was brought out in Chapter II of this article.
The majority in the Penrose Case took the position that section 21 of
Article II of the Missouri Constitution which provides, "That private
property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation" expressly limits the State's police power. Special em-
phasis is placed on the effect of the damage clause. That construction
appears to be erroneous. The Missouri Constitution of 1865 did not
contain the words "or damaged." The Constitution of 1865, Article 1,
section 16 provided: "That no private property ought to be taken or
applied to public use, without just compensation." The damage clause
was inserted in the Constitution of 1875 for remedial purposes to correct
the narrow interpretation the courts had placed upon the words "taken
131. For a fuller exposition on the nature and scope of the police power see
Hall, Cases on Constitutional Law, ch. X, pp. 318-531. Also see 12 C. J. pp. 904-932
and the cases there cited.
132. Welch v. Swasey (1909) 214 U. S. 91; Cliffside Park Really Co. V. Boroutgh
oj Cliffside Park (1921) 96 N. J. L. 278, 114 At. 797; State ex rel. Klefisch v. Wlisconsin
Telephone Co. (1923) 181 Wis. 519, 195 N. W. 544.
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for public use." We should construe the newer wording with reference to
the old provision, the evil to be corrected and the remedy."' Clearly, the
damage clause was intended to apply to a taking under eminent domain
for public use and was not intended to cut down or limit the state's
police power. Justice White pointed out in his dissenting opinion, on
the motion for rehearing, that the weight of the later Missouri decisions
confirms that view. Justice White quoted from the ruling in Man De
Vere v. Kansas City"' to prove that the court had construed the dam-
age clause to refer to special damages, and not to damages general to a
class. The quotation follows: "The plaintiff, if suing for consequential
damages, must show that he suffered an injury special and peculiar
to his property and that it was not enough to show a damage the same in
kind as that suffered by other persons, though different in degree."
As was stated by JusticeWhite, that ruling has been expressly approved in
Gorman v. Railroad,"' and Peters v. Buckner.136
The rulings in St. Louis Gunning Adu. Co. v. St. Louis137 and in Si.
Louis Poster Adv. Co. v. St. Louis'18 (both discussed supra,) and Kansas
City Gunning Adv. Co. v. Kansas City' indicate a greatly expanded police
power rather than a limited one.
A quotation from St. Louis Gunning Adv. Co. v. St. Louis'3 7 is
in point. Judge Woodson said:
"The Constitution of this State in the Bill of Rights provides that all
persons have a natural right to life, liberty, and the enjoyment of the
gains of their own industry ..... This, of course, does not confer upon
anyone the absolute right to use his property as he pleases. No such right
exists in a state of civil society; but on the contrary, the right of one to
use his own must always be exercised in subordination to the right of
others ..... The same instrument provides that 'no person shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' Clearly
this provision was not intended to withdraw the rights of private proper-
ty from the reasonable exercise of the police power by the legislative
branch of the Government. 'All rights are held subject to the police
power of the state.'"
133. That a constitutional provision should be examined in the light of prior
and contemporaneous history, and of the condition and circumstances under which
the constitutional provision was adopted, see: Maxwell v. Dow (1900) 176 U. S. 581;
Fargo v. Powers (1914) 220 Fed. 697; Ferrill v. Keel (1912) 105 Ark. 380, 151 S. W.
269; Gardnerv. Ray (1913) 154 Ky 509, 157 S. E. 1147.
134. (1891) 107 Mo. 83, p. 89, 17 S. W. 695.
135. (1913) 255 Mo. 483, 164 S. W. 509.
136. (1921) 288 Mo. 618,232 S. W. 1024.
137. (1911) 235 Mo. 99, 137 S. W. 929.
138. (1917) 195 S. W. 717.
139. (1912) 240 Mo. 659, 144 S. W. 1099.
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Judge Graves' opinion for the Missouri Supreme Court in the case of
State ex rel. v. Public Service Commissionl4 p. 210, quoted with approval
the Federal Supreme Court ruling in Chicago and A/ion R. Co. v.
Tranbarger,4 ' as follows:
" 'It is established by repeated decisions of this court that neither of
these provisions of the Federal Constitution has the effect of overriding
the power of the State to establish all regulations reasonably necessary to
secure the health, safety, or general welfare of the community; that this
power can neither be abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable
even by express grant; and that all contract and property rights are held
subject to its fair exercise. (Atlantic Coast Line v. Galdboro, 232 U. S.
548, 558, and cases cited.) And it is also settled that the police power
embraces regulations designed to promote the public convenience or the
general wefare and prosperity as well as those in the interest of the public
health, morals, or safety. (Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v.
Ohio, 173 U. S. 285, 292; C. B. &Z. Ry. v. Drainage Commissioners, 200
U. S. 561, 592; Bacon v. Walker, 204 U. S. 311, 317).' "
The Missouri cases relied on by the majority in the zoning cases, as
authority to prove a limited scope of the police power, can be clearly
distinguished. St. Louis v. Hill, St. Louis v. Dorr, and St. Louis v.
Dreisoerner (cases discussed supra in this chapter) are not authority for
a limited police power. As was brought out, those cases did not involve
comprehensive zoning ordinances but dealt with special cases. These
ordinances were unreasonable because the restrictions imposed had no
relation to public health, morals, or safety and were in a measure dis-
criminatory since they applied to only a part of the city with no consti-
tutional basis for the classification. Those rulings would stand even
under the more liberal view as to the scope of the police power. The case
of Kansas City v. Liebi (discussed supra) involved an exercise of the
power of eminent domain. The question of police power was not in-
volved but the rulings in that case indicate a liberal view as to the
nature of a public use.
As I have attempted to bring out, the later Missouri decisions
(excepting the zoning cases) indicate that Missouri's police power has an
average scope if not an expanded one, and that section 21 of Article II
of the Missouri Constitution does not limit the scope of this power.
The narrow view taken by the majority as to the scope of the
police power apparently precluded a consideration of the reasonableness
of the particular zoning ordinance and of zoning in general. This attitude
is hardly in accord with an earlier statement in St. Louis v. Theatre
140. (1918) 275 Mo. 201,204S. W. 497.
141. (1915) 238 U. S. 67, 76. (The italics are Judge Graves'.)
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Co.,4 quoted by the dissenting opinion in the Penrose Case. Judge White
said:
"What the urgent necessities of the public are in a crowded city, we
are unable to judge without more than the legislative act in the shape of
an ordinance. 'Municipal corporations ar prima facie the sole judges of
the necessity of their ordinances and courts will not, ordinarily, review
their reasonableness, when passed in strict pursuance of an express
grant.' "
The Missouri Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled in accord with
the weight of authority that there is a presumption in favor of constitu-
tionality of all legislative acts and that all doubts are resolved in favor
of the constitutionality.43
The court in its zeal to protect the individual lost sight of the public
welfare. Zoning is a new type of property regulation. It has been
evolved to secure public benefits which the law of nuisances and a less
comprehensive application of the police power have been inadequate to
secure. Alfred Bretman14 has ably stated this iiewas follows:
"The law of nuisance operates by way of prevention as well as by
suppression. The zoning ordinance, by segregating the industrial
districts from the residential districts, aims to produce, by a process of
prevention applied over the whole territory of the city throughout an
extensive period of time, the segregation of the noises and odors and
turmoils necessarily incident to the operation of industry from those
sections in *which the homes of the people are or may appropriately be
located. The mode of regulation may be new; but the purpose and the
fundamental philosophy are the same. If, as is the case, one of the aims
of zoning be to segregate industrial and commercial street traffic from
the lighter and quieter forms of traffic, by means of the segregation of the
districts in which these different types of traffic normally develop,
then zoning becomes obviously a mode of prevention of noise. True,
the noiseless or odorless plant is excluded along with the nuisance type.
Experience demonstrates, however, that the advent of the first non-
residential structure in a residential neighborhood makes it more unfair
and therefore more difficult to prevent the arrival of the second, even
though the second be more nearly a nuisance type than the first; that
these non-residential structures tend to locate themselves in a scattered
and spotty manner, thus harming a larger territory than would be
142. (1907) 202 Mo. 690, 100 S. W. 627.
143. State v. Cantwell (1904) 179 Mo. 245, 78 S. W. 569; Ex Parle Loring (1903)
178 Mo. 194, 77 S. W. 508; State v. Thompson (1898) 144 Mo. 314, 46 S. W. 191;
State ex inf. v. Merchants Exchange (1916) 269 Mo. 346, 190 S. WV. 903. Accord:
Atkins v. Kans. (1903) 191 U S. 207; Munn v. I1. (1876) 94 U. S. 131.
144. Bretman, Harvard Law Review, XXXVII, p. 837.
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affected if they were more compactly situated; that often the neighbor-
hood becomes blighted as a place of habitation, without substantially
developing as a business or industrial district; that, consequently, the
single new plant, however non-nuisance in itself, may not be inoffensive,
or, at least falls well within the settled principle of constitutional law
which permits the innocuous to be included within the prohibition or
regulation when such inclusion is reasonably necessary in order that the
harmful may be successfully combatted."
Many courts sustain reasonable zoning as a proper exercise of thc
police power."' Unreasonable and arbitrary zoning laws can no more
be sustained under the police power than can any other unreasonable
police regulation violative of due process.
The Federal Supreme Court in Hadacheck v. Sabastian, (sustaining
the California Supreme Court in holding an ordinance valid under the
police power that restricted a certain area to residential use) in speaking
of the case of Reinman v. Little Rock, where a livery stable was excluded
from a certain district, said: "granting that the business was not a
nuisance per se, it was clearly within the police power of the state to
regulate it." The court also said: "There must be progress, and if in its
march private interests are in the way they must yield to the good of
the community." The Federal Supreme Court has held three times that a
municipal government under its police power (when the latter has been
properly delegated to it) may prohibit the owners of property from using
their property for business purposes in residence districts."'
The Utah Supreme Court 47 upholding an ordinance of Salt Lake
City designating certain areas as residence districts and prohibiting
certain businesses (among which was the foundry business) from said
areas ruled, that where the creation of a residence district would ex-
tend to the needs of the general public, the power to regulate or prohibit
by ordinance the invasion of such a district by industrial plants ought
not to be questioned on the ground that the exclusion of the industrial
plant would be the taking of private property without just compensation.
In the case of Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corporation'48
an action was brought to compel specific performance of a contract to
purchase land free from encumbrance. The court held that the New
York Zoning ordinance dividing New York City into districts and regu-
lating the height, area, and uses of buildings and land was a proper
145. See cases supra.
146. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, (1912) 229 U. S. 394; Cusack v. Chicago (1916)
242 U. S. 529; St. Louis Poster 4dv. Co. v. St. Louis'(1918) 249 U. S. 269.
147. Salt Lake City v. Western Foundry and Stoue Rep. Wrks. (1920) 55 Utah
447, 187 Pac. 829.
148. (1920) 229 N. Y. 313, 128 N. E. 209.
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exercise of the police power and did not constitute an encumbrance since
the contract to purchase the land was entered into subject to the same.
The court said: "In a great metropolis like New York, in which the
public health, welfare, convenience and common good are to be consider-
ed, I am of the opinion that the resolution was not an encumbrance,
since it was a proper exercise of the police power."
The reasonableness of zoning was well brought out by the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court in the Opinion of the Justices.4 9 In deciding
-that the state zoning-enabling act would not violate any part of the
Federal Constitution the Court said: "The segregation of manufacturing,
commercial and mercantile business of various kinds to particular
localities, when exercised with reason, may be thought to bear a rational
relation to the health and safety of the community. We do not think it
can be said that circumstances do not exist in connection with the ordina-
ry operation of such kinds of business which increase the risk of fire, and
which render life less secure to those living in homes in close proximity.
Health and security from injury of children and the old and feeble and
otherwise less robust portion of the public well may be thought to be
promoted by requiring that dwelling houses be separated from the
territory devoted to trade and industry. The suppression and preven-
tion of disorder, the extinguishment of fires, the enforcement of regula-
tions for street traffic, and other ordinances designed rightly to promote
the general welfare, may be facilitated by the establishment of zones or
districts for business as distinguished from residence."
The.New York Court in Cohen v. Rosendale Realty Co." ° upheld
the zoning resolution for Brooklyn and prohibited the erection of-a
building unlawfully commenced before its passage.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey in Cli.ffside Park
Realty Co. v. Borough of Cliffsidesi refused to declare the elaborate
zoning ordinance of Cliffside Park unconstitutional in oto because it
unduly restricted the use of property and because parts of it were invalid.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has upheld zoning restrictions in the
form of block district ordinances. r"2 Although the Louisiana Constitu-
tion of 1921, Article 14, section 29, authorized zoning, the reasoning
employed would probably have sustained it as a police power measure
without the constitutional provision. The reasoning is much like that
149. (1920) 234 Mass. 597,611,127 N. E. 525.
150. (1923) 199 N. Y. Supp. 4.
151. (1921) 96N.J.L.278, 114AtI.797.
152. See Civello v. New Orleans (and cases following) (1923) 154 La. ',71, 287,
290, 97 So. 440; Boland v. Compagno (1923) 154 La. 470, 97 So. 661. The case of
Calva v. New Orleans (1915) 136 La. 480, 67 So. 338, is overruled.
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used by the courts of other states to sustain more comprehensive zoning
ordinances.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in the well-reasoned case of Slate
ex rel Carter v. Harper'53 sustained the comprehensive zoning law for
Milwaukee in holding that the realtor was not entitled to a building
permit to enlarge his dairy business in violation of said ordinance, even
though he was engaged in said business before the zoning law was passed.
The court, in holding that zoning was proper under the police power and
not a violation of either the State or Federal Constitutions, summarized
the benefits to cities adopting zoning as follows:
"They attract a desirable and assure a permanent citizenship;
they foster pride in and an attachment to the city; they promote happi-
ness and contentment; they stabilize the use and value of property and
promote the peace, tranquillity, and good order of the city. We do not
hesitate to say that the attainment of these objects affords a legitimate
field for the exercise of thepolice power. He who owns property in such a
district is not deprived of its use by such regulations. He may use it for
the purposes to which the section in which it is located is dedicated.
That he shall not be permitted to use it to the desecration of the com-
munity constitutes no unreasonable or permanent hardship and re-
sults in no unjust burden."
In speaking of the question of aesthetics in that case, Justice Owens
said on p. 455:
"It is sometimes said that these regulations rest solely upon aesthetic
considerations ..... It seems to us that aesthetic considerations are
relative in their nature. With the passing of -time, social standards
conform to new ideals. As a race, our sensibilities are becoming more
refined, and that which formerly did not offend cannot now be endured.
That which the common law did not condemn as a nuisance is now
frequently outlawed as such by the written law. This is not because the
subject outlawed is of a different nature, but because our sensibilities
have become more refined and our ideals more exacting. Nauseous
smells have always come under the ban of the law, but ugly sights and
discordant surroundings may be just as distressing to keener sensibilities.
The rights of property should not be sacrificed to the pleasure of an ultra
aesthetic taste. But whether they should be permitted to plague the
average or dominant human sensibilities, well may be pondered."
The New York Supreme Court in Palmer v. Mann'" upheld the
153. (1923) 182Wis. 148, 196N. W. 451.
154. (1923) 198 N. Y. Supp. 548. The decision was reversed in Palnerv. lann
(201 N. Y. Supp. 525) because of a different interpretation of some of the detailed
provisions of the ordinance that affected this particular case. The ruling as to the
constitutionality was not involved in the rehearing.
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elaborate zoning plan for New York City and ruled that the petitioner
must comply with the height restrictions before she could demand a
building permit.
In Schait v. Senior,"" the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the
New Jersey Home Rule Act authorizing a city under its police power to
enact zoning ordinances to promote the public health, safety, and general
welfare was valid, and that the ordinance of Newark prohibiting the
erection of garages within a 200 foot radius of certain public buildings
was constitutional.
Many other cases have sustained zoning as a proper exercise of the
police power where the restrictions contained in the zoning ordinances
have had any reasonable connection with the accomplishment of a public
need relative to the public health, morals, safety, and general welfare. 1"0
There are cases that are often cited as authority to prove that zoning is
unconstitutional, but all of these cases, except the Missouri cases in-
volving the St. Louis zoning ordinance, can be distinguished. Some
writers seem to have failed to understand the real basis of the Missouri
Supreme Court's decisions in the zoning cases. 157
155. (1922)97 N.J. L. 390,117 At. 517.
156. See Ware v. Wichita (1923) 113 Kans. 153, 214 Pac. 99; Manhattan Oil
Co. v. Des Moines (1922) 193 Iowa 1096, 188 N. NV. 921; Salt Lake City v. IJ'estern
Foundry Wks. (1920) 55 Utah 447, 187 Pac. 829. Also see People v. Village of Oak
Park, (1914) 266 Ill. 365, 107 N. E. 636, holding valid an ordinance prohibiting the
erection of automobile garages within certain districts. The court said that gar-
ages would become nuisances in some localities.
Brown v. City of Los Angeles (1920) 183 Calif. 783, 192 Pac. 716, holds that Los
Angeles under the police power can confine the undertaking business to certain areas.
The court pointed out that Cal. had regulated livery stables, laundries, soap and glue
factories, carpet beating establishments, lumber yards, brick yards, billboards,
cemeteries, private hospitals for inebriates, insane and tubercular patients under the
police power and that their maintenance may be prohibited under that power.
State ex rel. Twi City Building and Investment Co. v. Houghton (1920) 144 Minn.
1, 174 N. W. 885, holds that there is a sufficient public purpose involved in prohibiting
an apartment building in a residence district, to justify the exercise of the power of
eminent domain. A general zoning scheme was not involved but the reasoning as to
the public purpose is very favorable for zoning under the police power.
Sheldon v. Board of Alppeals of New York (1921) 189 N. Y. S. 772, and Standard
Oil Co. v. City of Montgomery (Ala. 1924 or 1925, unreported) uphold zoning under the
police power. Also Walcher v. First Presbyterian Church (1919) 76 Okla. 9,184 Pac. 106,
upheld an ordinance prohibiting certain industries within 150 ft. of a church, school
or hospital. Matter of McIntosh v. Johnson (1919) 211 N. Y. 265, 105 N. E. 414,
prohibited public garages within fifty feet of a school.
Other cases upholding zoning principles are Smolensky v. City of Chicago (1917) 282
Ill. 131, 118 N. E. 410; Hench v. East Orange(1924) N.J. Adv. R. vol. II, No.26;State
ex rel. Danzig u. Durant (Ohio Appeals, 1923) 21 Ohio L. Bulletin and Rep. 395.
157. Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the use of Property, p. 629,
reprinted from 9 Minnesota Law Review, 518-541, 593-637. Bassett, National
Municipal Review, XIII, Sept. 1924.
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The Michigan Supreme Court in Clements v. McCabe'1 held the De-
troit zoning ordinance void because the state had not delegated sufficient
police power to that city. It merely holds that the city has no inherent
power to zone its territory. Power to zone must come from the state.
In the case of Spann v. Dallas"i9 the Texas Supreme Court ruled that
the City of Dallas could not impose restrictive conditions upon the
construction of a building for the ordinary retail store business in a
residential district. Here the city was attempting to apply zoning princi-
ples in a spotty, piecemeal fashion. The decision turned on the point
that the city had never been authorized by the state to adopt zoning,
and is not an authority against zoning.
The Illinois Supreme Court in Friend v. Chicago' ruled that Chicago
had exceeded her delegated power in adopting zoning. Here again the
lack of delegated power is the basis of the decision although the court in
arriving at that conclusion uses language that would seem to be against
zoning. Relatively, this is not a late case.
The cases of Romar Reality Co. v. Board of Com'rs. of Haddenfield0 '
and Levy et al. v. Mrovlag6 2 are often cited as authority for the uncon-
stitutionality of zoning. The New Jersey court held the ordinances void
in both cases as an improper use of the police power. In the Romar case
the ordinance attacked purported to unreasonably restrict the construc-
tion of buildings and to limit the kinds of buildings on a certain highway
without making compensation. In the Levy case, the ordinance pro-
hibited the erection of a building for retail purposes in a certain residen-
tial area unless three-fourths of the property owners assented to the
erection of the building. Neither case involved comprehensive zoning
and can be easily distinguished from the zoning cases since in both the
ordinances were clearly unreasonable.
The New Jersey Court in a later case, Ignaciunas v. Risley et al.'0 1
held a provision of the comprehensive zoning ordinance of Nultey
invalid but refused to declare the whole ordinance void. The court made
it clear that the prohibition of the erection of a store building in the
designated area was unreasonable because it had no bearing on health,
morals, or safety. The case resolves itself into the proposition that zoning
as an exercise of the police power must be reasonable.
158. (1920) 210 Mich. 207, 177 N. W. 722.
159. (1921) 111 Texas 350, 235 S. W. 513.
160. (1913) 261 Ill. 16, 103 N. E. 609.
161. (1921) 96 N. J. L. 117, 114 At. 248.
162. (1921) 96N. J.L.367, 115 At. 350. Accord: Dorison u. Saul (1922) (N. J.)
118 At. 691.
163. (1923)98 N.J. L. 712, 121 Atl. 782.
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The Nebraska Supreme Court in State ex rel. lWestminster Presby-
terian Church v. Edgecomb" ruled that that part of the Omaha zoning
ordinance which restricted lot occupancy in certain parts of the city to
25% was unreasonable and that the relators were entitled to a building
permit for a building to cover 373/2o of their lot. Here only a provision
of the ordinance was declared void, but that ruling is contra to the better
principles as well as the weight of authority. The better view is expressed
in judge Rose's dissent in that case.
Aside from the recent Missouri decisions, the cases that seem to
hold against zoning may be classed under three heads, namely those
where the city attempted zoning without an enabling act, those where
zoning was void because it was piecemeal and clearly unreasonableles
and those where some provisions of the zone scheme were arbitrary and
unreasonable, in their application-a matter that might well have
been avoided by the proper functioning of a zoning board of appeals.16
An exhaustive study of the cases shows conclusively that zoning is
proper under the police power, and Judge Woodson's assertion in the
Evraiff case that the weight of authority condemns zoning as an exercise
of the police power is not sustained by the facts.
IV
Conclusion
We are living in a highly organized society where regulation is
necessary to protect freedom. Personal liberties and property rights are
valuable because of such regulations. As the public needs change, our
laws governing human beings and regulating property must change.
What is a public need is largely a matter of public opinion and is then
in the ultimate psychological. Our constitutions do not change with
every popular clamor but they cah be interpreted in the light of modern
knowledge and present-day needs. Our Federal Constitution owes its
existence today to such interpretations.
164. (1922) 108 Nebr. 859, 189 N. IV. 617.
165. See Willison, Bldg. Inspector of Denver v. Cooke (1913) 54 Colo. 320, 130
Pac. 828; Roerig v. Minneapolis (1917) 136 Minn. 479, 162 N. NV. 477; Lachiman a.
Houghton (1916) 134 Minn. 226, 158 N. W. 1017. None of these cases involve a
general zoning scheme and strictly speaking are not zoning cases. They should not be
cited as authority against zoning. Also see Goldman v. Crowther (1925) 147 Md. 282,
128 Ad. 50; Ambler Realty Co. v. Euclid Village (1924) 21 Ohio L. B. 607. See cases
collected by Bassett, National Municipal Review XIII, Sept. 1924, foot-note 18, p.
496, on the successful functioning of the New York Board of Zoning Appeals. It is
true that a board of appeals operates as a sort of safety valve to relieve the unreason-
ableness of a zoning ordinance.
166. Bassett, Am. City, XXVI, p. 50.
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Zoning is a new social instrument. It is a means to an end and not an
end in itself. By causing the city to develop along planned and orderly
lines and thus promoting the public health, happiness, safety, morals and
general welfare, it helps to insure a more wholesome and prosperous
life and better citizens in the future. The weight of authority sustains it
as an exercise of the police power, conferred by constitutional amendment
or by statute. There must be an express grant of the police power to the
municipality.
The Missouri Court with a four-to-three decision has taken the
position that zoning regulations can only be imposed under eminent
domain, with just compensation being given. It is axiomatic in our
constitutional law, State and Federal, that under the police power
harmful uses of property may be and are prevented. The Missouri
Court seems to limit the use of the police power for this purpose and to
require the exercise of the power of eminent domain in zoning cases.
The court exaggerates the old idea that every person can use his property
as he pleases. The majority of the court supported their position with
their interpretation of Article II, section 21, of the Missouri Constitu-
tion which provides: "That private property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation." They seem to
hold that this constitutional provision limits the exercise of the State's
police power.
The issues of police power and public use in the Missouri zoning
cases were more or less confused by questions concerning the grant of
power. Perhaps, when a zoning case arising under the enabling act
passed at the 1925 session of the Missouri Legislature is properly pre-
sented to the court, it will, after a better review of the decisions, sustain
zoning under the police power. However, a strict adherence to the
doctrine and rulings laid down in the Penrose and other zoning cases
and the dicta of Judge Graves in Better Built Home and Mortgage Co. v.
Davis167 would preclude zoning under the police power and make zoning
possible only under eminent domain-a result that could be prevented
only by an amendment to the Missouri Constitution.
167. (1924) 302 Mo. 307, 259 S. W. 80.
